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NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL 
CONSTITUTION: NAVIGATING THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS BOTH VERTICALLY AND HORIZONTALLY 
Erin Ryan * 
Response to: Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1595 (2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay explores the emerging literature on the negotiation of 
structural constitutional governance, to which Professor Aziz Huq has 
made an important contribution in The Negotiated Structural Constitution.1 
In the piece, Professor Huq reviews the negotiation of constitutional 
entitlements and challenges the conventional wisdom about the limits of 
political bargaining as a means of allocating authority among the three 
branches of government.2 Building on his previous structural-governance 
research,3 he argues that constitutional ambiguities in the horizontal 
allocation of power are best resolved through legislative–executive nego-
                                                                                                                           
 *. Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., 
Harvard Law School, M.A., Wesleyan University. I am grateful to Aziz for suggesting this 
response, to him and all the other scholars of negotiated governance for inspiring it, to 
Ozan Varol and Jim Oleske for their helpful comments, and to Gabe Hinman and Ashley 
Garcia for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595 
(2014) [hereinafter Huq, Structural Constitution]. 
 2. Id. at 1602. 
 3. See Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist 
Approach, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 723, 741, 791–94 (2013) (addressing allocation of state and 
federal power in zone of twilight between federalism and foreign-affairs concerns); Aziz Z. 
Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 
217, 277–78 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Logic of Collective Action] (critiquing proposition 
that judicial federalism constraints are necessary to resolve collective-action problems); 
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 70–76 (2013) [hereinafter 
Huq, Removal as Political Question] (arguing removal of agency officials should be con-
sidered judicially unreviewable political question); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the 
Structural Constitution, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1464–75 (2013) [hereinafter Huq, Standing] 
(critiquing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011), a Tenth Amendment case, and 
arguing only disempowered institutions, not individuals, should have standing to litigate 
alleged structural violations of Constitution); Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated 
Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575, 611–13, 652–55 (2013) (evaluating various 
doctrinal formulae Court has used to evaluate different enumerated constitutional powers 
and proposing new system wherein Court adopts uniform standard of review for all enu-
merated powers). 
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tiation, just as uncertain grants of constitutional authority are already 
negotiated between state and federal actors in the vertical-federalism 
context.4 Speaking the vocabulary of law and economics, Huq uses 
Coasean reasoning to show that political bargaining is both an inevitable 
and comparatively desirable response to the navigation of constitutional 
uncertainty.5 In the piece, he painstakingly refutes countervailing argu-
ments by the opponents of interbranch bargaining, even though these 
arguments have prevailed in much of the Supreme Court’s separation-of-
powers jurisprudence.6 
Nevertheless, Huq is not alone in his scholarly recognition of the 
significance of negotiation in structural governance—even in constitu-
tional realms that appear to hinge on the implementation of nonnego-
tiable principles of separation.7 In vertical and horizontal separation-of-
powers contexts, the allocation of authority along bright lines of sep-
aration may seem to be an intrinsic, if not defining, structural feature. 
Indeed, one might reasonably ask what is the point of the Constitution’s 
separation-of-powers directives, so purposefully dividing power horizon-
tally (among the three branches of government) and vertically (between 
the state and federal levels), if it is not to preserve an initial allocation of 
distinct governing authority? Yet as I have previously shown in the 
vertical-federalism context, and Huq convincingly shows horizontally, 
these bright lines of differentiation are not always possible, nor even 
beneficial—nor necessarily intended by the Framers.8 At the margins 
                                                                                                                           
 4. Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1632. 
 5. Id. at 1646. 
 6. Id. at 1660–61 (discussing Bowsher v. Synar and INS v. Chadha). 
 7. See infra Part II (reviewing literature on negotiated structural governance). 
 8. For Professor Huq’s analysis of the horizontal separation-of-powers dimension, 
see generally Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1. For my analysis of the vertical 
dimension, see generally Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within (2012) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Tug of War] (proposing theory of federalism that balances tension 
among federalism’s underlying principles and roles of three branches in implementing it); 
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503 (2007) [hereinafter Ryan, Seeking 
Checks and Balance] (exploring inevitable jurisdictional overlap and uncertainty between 
clearer realms of state and federal authority); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment 
Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral] 
(analyzing rules of exchange for constitutional entitlements of authority within state–
federal bargaining); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism] (analyzing state–federal bargaining in 
federalism-sensitive governance and proposing limited judicial review of qualifying 
political bargaining); see also Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, 
in The Law and Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kalyani 
Robbins ed., forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of 
War Within] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (closing chapter analyzing how en-
vironmental law showcases wider conflicts in federalism theory and structures of 
governance it has evolved to manage them); Erin Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges 
of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within, in 1 The Ways of Federalism in Western 
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between state and federal authority, executive and legislative authority, 
and even judicial and political authority, inevitable zones of overlap and 
spillover emerge where interpretive choices must be made.9 The opera-
tive constitutional question then becomes who is best positioned to make 
these interpretive choices.10 
The Supreme Court’s preferred answer is usually that uncertain 
constitutional text requires judicial interpretation, and in contexts 
involving countermajoritarian rights, there is much to recommend this 
position.11 In comparison to the political branches, courts possess a 
clearly superior capacity to vindicate the Constitution’s core promises to 
individuals, notwithstanding the contrary political preferences of their 
neighbors.12 However, interpretive uncertainty regarding separation-of-
powers questions involves wholly different constitutional consider-
ations.13 While different scholars of negotiated governance advocate 
                                                                                                                           
Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain 267 (Alberto López-
Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio eds., 2013) (analyzing developments in state–
federal intergovernmental bargaining); Erin Ryan, A Response to Heather Gerken’s 
“Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?”, 59 St. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 
2015) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (commenting on Professor Gerken’s 
proposed synthesis of federalism and nationalism); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and 
Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1003 (2014) [hereinafter Ryan, 
Spending Power] (analyzing state–federal spending power bargaining). 
 9. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 145–80 (discussing “interjurisdictional gray 
area”); see also Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1657 (explaining intermural 
bargaining caused by spillovers). 
 10. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at xi–xii (identifying fundamental federalism 
inquiry as “who gets to decide?” at levels of both state–federal competition over policy and 
judicial–political branch competition for interpretive supremacy); see also Huq, Structural 
Constitution, supra note 1, at 1663 (comparing judicial and political branch capacity for 
decision). 
 11. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 348 (discussing why structural and rights-
based constitutional features warrant different interpretive tools, including more judicial 
review for rights-based violations); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1065–72 (1980) (critiquing process-based 
constitutional interpretive theory in light of Constitution’s substantive commitment to 
human rights and individual dignity). 
 12. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Why Equal Protection Trumps Federalism in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Cases, The Huffington Post: HuffPost Politics (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/gay-marriage-states-rights_b_3100985.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Constitutional individual rights are . . . counter-
majoritarian. You hold them regardless of what the majority thinks, and they are most dear 
when the majority is against you . . . . Equal protection is the Constitution’s promise that 
you won’t be treated unfairly by the government, even when most Americans really want 
you to be.”).  
 13. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175–76 
(1980) (differentiating constitutional protections for individual rights and structural fed-
eralism); Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 348 (“In contrast to adjudicating rights, a 
substantive realm in which the Constitution’s directions are relatively clear, the adju-
dication of federalism draws on penumbral implications in the text that leave much more 
to interpretation.”). 
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different degrees of judicial review in structural contexts,14 judicial claims 
for interpretive supremacy on the basis of countermajoritarian capacity 
inevitably lose much of their force here.15 The purposefully undemo-
cratic, retrospectively limited, evidentiary-confined federal judiciary is 
not always best positioned to make marginal structural calls in compar-
ison to the political branches’ capacity for prospective, comprehensive, 
flexible, and adaptive decisionmaking.16 
Huq’s analysis of institutional bargaining along the horizontal 
separation-of-powers dimension contributes an important piece of the 
puzzle to the emerging literature on negotiated structural governance. 
Previously predominated by vertical separation-of-powers analyses in the 
federalism literature, this new wave of bargaining-literate scholarship 
emphasizes the usefulness and inevitability of multilateral bargaining as 
an alternative for allocating constitutional authority in circumstances 
where unilateral judicial or statutory allocation is suboptimal at best—
and counterproductive at worst.17 Thematic among these new works is 
the idea that the Constitution does not resolve every structural question 
and that certain unresolved structural dilemmas are most capably 
resolved by negotiation among institutional actors. These include 
legislative and executive actors at the local, state, and national levels (and 
less directly, even judicial actors).18 Different authors provide different 
components of the new theoretical justification for judicial deference to 
politically negotiated governance, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
simultaneous revival of judicially enforceable constraints in many of 
these contexts.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See infra Part III.C (reviewing literature skeptical of judicial review of political 
bargaining). 
 15. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 339–56 (“The role of the political branches 
articulated here rounds out the equipoise that Balanced Federalism seeks not only among 
the competing values of federalism, but in the contributions of these three branches—at 
all levels of government—in locating the appropriate balance in each instance.”); see also 
Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1674–75 (rejecting arguments for judicial 
primacy). 
 16. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 339–56. 
 17. See infra Part II (reviewing emerging literature on negotiated structural 
governance). 
 18. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 314 (analyzing role of state and federal 
courts in intersystemic signaling negotiations); Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 
8, at 73 (same); see also Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 
501, 503, 509–47 (2008) (showing state judges have occasionally sought to alter binding 
rulings by Supreme Court through subsequent state court decisions). 
 19. For a review of judicially enforceable constraints in the horizontal separation-of-
powers context, see Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1621–31. For a review of 
judicially enforceable constraints in the vertical-federalism context, see Ryan, Seeking 
Checks and Balance, supra note 8, at 539–66; see also Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 
109–44 (discussing Supreme Court’s revival of judicially enforceable federalism con-
straints). The Court’s creation in 2012 of new constraints on spending power bargaining 
represents the newest addition to the set of judicially enforceable structural-governance 
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This Essay reviews the unfolding literature on the negotiation of 
structural governance, establishing general points of agreement and 
issues of ongoing debate. Part II outlines the emerging scholarship, with 
special attention to the most sustained scholarly treatments of vertical-
federalism bargaining (including my own work) and horizontal inter-
branch bargaining (focusing on Huq’s work). Part III analyzes points of 
conversion and diversion within the structural bargaining literature. 
Overall, scholars of negotiated governance find that bargaining is 
inevitable because the text of the Constitution cannot account for every 
possible ambiguity. Moreover, they conclude that political bargaining to 
resolve ambiguity is valuable when the required decisionmaking does not 
match the circumscribed skillset of judicial interpreters. Most are 
skeptical about the value of judicial review as current doctrine prescribes 
it, but—and in contrast with previous scholarship emphasizing political 
safeguards—many allow for some judicial role to police the most fore-
seeable harms associated with political bargaining. Part IV concludes with 
thoughts about issues that warrant further scrutiny in the next iteration 
of the discourse. 
II. THE EMERGING LITERATURE ON NEGOTIATED STRUCTURAL GOVERNANCE 
This section provides a snapshot of the emerging literature on 
negotiated structural governance. It is self-consciously inexhaustive, 
because new work touching on the significance of negotiated governance 
continues to arise in many different subdisciplines of regulatory-law 
scholarship—especially environmental law,20 but also health law,21 drug 
                                                                                                                           
constraints. See Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 8, at 1017–33 (discussing Sebelius 
spending limit). 
 20. See Robin Kundis Craig, The Clean Water Act and the Constitution 7 (2d ed. 
2009) (describing cooperative federalism of federal statutory water quality regime dividing 
regulatory authority between federal government and states); David E. Adelman & Kirsten 
H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1800 (2008) (proposing adaptive-systems model of 
federalism for environmental regulation); William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: 
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 Emory L.J. 
145, 154, 157 (2007) (describing importance of interaction between multiple regulatory 
actors for effective action); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1099 (2009) (“The most innovative state responses to climate change 
are . . . the results of repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking efforts involving both 
levels of government—what [the author calls] ‘iterative federalism.’”); Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159, 
161 (2006) (arguing “static allocation of authority between the state and federal 
government is inconsistent with the process of policymaking in our federal system, in 
which multiple levels of government interact in the regulatory process”); Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 570–74 (1996) (opposing 
pure decentralization and preferring coordinated regulatory structure keyed to nature of 
particular environmental problems); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective 
Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case 
of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 582 (2008) (describing federal, state, 
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law,22 immigration law,23 administrative law,24 and others.25 While this 
review gives special attention to Huq’s leading work on horizontal 
                                                                                                                           
and local regulation in environmental law); Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1643, 1649–53 (2014) (proposing federal, state, and local 
governments share authority to combat threats to U.S. forests); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 
189, 217–22 (2002) (describing success of ecosystem management systems involving fed-
eral, state, and local governments, independent scientists, and private landowners); Alice 
Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of 
State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 Denver U. L. Rev. 791, 792–93 (2008) (promoting 
state administration and enhancement of baseline federal climate-change standards); 
Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
Iowa L. Rev. 545, 547 (2007) (arguing for state environmental common law to draw upon 
federal statutes, regulations, and data); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate 
Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2011) 
(describing “diagonal strategies” that “incorporate key public and private actors at 
different levels of government (the vertical piece) and within each level of government 
(the horizontal piece) simultaneously in order to create needed crosscutting inter-
actions”); Hari M. Osofsky and Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. 
L. Rev. 773, 778 (2013) (proposing dynamic-federalism model in energy law that “map[s] 
interactions among different levels of government . . . and key entities at each level of 
government”). 
 21. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, 
Medicaid and the Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1749, 1752 
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federal Statutes] (finding federal statutes granting states 
implementation powers this era’s “critical federalism relationships”); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal 
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 542 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Interpretation] (finding traditional federalism values in state interpretation 
and implementation of federal health-care reform, despite “almost-infinite reach” of 
federal regulatory power); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Common-Law Constitutionalism, the 
Constitutional Common Law, and the Validity of the Individual Mandate, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 
1245, 1246 (2012) (finding recent judicially crafted constitutional rules susceptible to 
legislative override); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective 
Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 
38 Am. J.L. & Med. 288, 289 (2012) [hereinafter Moncrieff, Cost–Benefit Federalism] 
(proposing cost-benefit theory to bridge gap between federalist goals of regulatory 
efficiency and individual liberty). 
 22. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism: Colorado’s Legalization 
of Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1067, 1070 (2014) 
(describing “unbundling” of federalism, wherein states pursue state interests inside 
federal administrative schemes or use state lawmaking power to advance federal goals); 
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. 
Rev. 74, 78–79 (2014) (proposing federal government allow states to opt out of marijuana 
provisions of federal Controlled Substances Act and apply permissive state law); Robert A. 
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power 
to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1423–24 (2009) (“States may continue to 
legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted—and more importantly, may not 
preempt—state laws that merely permit . . . private conduct the federal government deems 
objectionable.”); Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 
1669, 1673 (2007) (finding states’ rights survive populist control of Congress because of 
fragmentation of popular opinion and citizens’ inclination to limit federal power). 
 23. See, e.g., Cristina Rodríguez et al., Legal Limits on Immigration Federalism, in 
Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States 31, 48 (Monica 
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separation-of-powers bargaining and mine in vertical-federalism bargain-
ing, it also integrates the contributions of other important authors in the 
discourse, including Heather Gerken, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Abbe Gluck, 
Cristina Rodríguez, Samuel Bagenstos, Bridget Fahey, Ari Holztblatt, 
Abigail Moncrieff, Jim Rossi, Adrian Vermeule, Mark Rosen, Curtis 
Bradley, Trevor Morrison, and Enrique Guerra-Pujol. Huq and I offer the 
most sustained theoretical treatments in which structural bargaining is 
the principal feature, but each of these scholars contributes to a dis-
course that understands the Constitution as a potential framework for 
ongoing negotiation among institutional actors. 
Most of this literature begins with the premise, explicitly or implic-
itly, that just as the Constitution allocates various legal entitlements to 
individuals (usually in the form of rights against majoritarian utility), it 
also confers various entitlements to governance institutions (usually as 
grants of authority to govern). For example, the Bill of Rights confers a 
famous set of countermajoritarian rights on individuals,26 while Articles I, 
II, and III articulate the powers and responsibilities of the three federal 
branches of government,27 and the Constitution’s various federalism 
directives distinguish between enumerated federal authority and re-
served state authority.28 Whether conferred as rights on individuals or 
                                                                                                                           
W. Varsanyi ed., 2010) (“[I]mmigration is having a significant impact on state and local 
budgets and communities and . . . Congress should recognize the states as partners in the 
management of immigration . . . .”); Juliet P. Stumpf, Preemption and Proportionality in 
State and Local Crimmigration Law, in The Constitution and the Future of Criminal 
Justice in America 241, 243 (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013) (discussing 
intersection of state statutes criminalizing immigration with more permissive federal law). 
 24. See e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke 
L.J. 2023, 2028–29 (2008) (arguing administrative law protects state interests and advances 
federalism without unjustifiable judicial intrusion on congressional power); Edward 
Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 
2073, 2075 (2005) (arguing “true accountability, in the realm of politics and law,” is 
bureaucratic in nature and “involves many of the features that are central to the 
administrative state”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run Around 
the Administrative Process?, 122 Yale L.J. Online 1, 1 (2012), http://www.yalelaw 
journal.org /forum/preemption-as-a-judicial-end-run-around-the-administrative-process (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting preemption challenges provide parallel 
proceedings in courts to determine whether  state and federal laws conflict). 
 25. For a more thorough review of literature engaging many of these issues in 
different fields of regulatory law, see generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and 
Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, St. Louis L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter 
Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 26. See U.S. Const. amends. I–IX (setting forth various individual rights to free 
speech, religion, equal protection, and others). 
 27. U.S. Const. arts. I–III (setting forth legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
respectively). 
 28. The Constitution’s federalism directives are scattered throughout the document, 
often cognizable only in relation to one another. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (enu-
merating certain powers to Congress), with U.S. Const. amend. X (reserving to states those 
powers not enumerated to federal government nor expressly prohibited to them); 
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authority to institutions of governance, constitutional grants can be 
understood as allocations of discrete legal entitlements, combining two 
important components: (1) the substantive component, describing what 
the right or power is for, and (2) instructions as to whether the sub-
stantive component may be shifted away from its initial allocation, or 
traded with another party.29 In the text of the Constitution, the sub-
stantive component is (usually) relatively clear, but the rules for shifting 
or trading entitlements are (usually) not—occasionally requiring more 
challenging interpretation.30 
Many individual rights have been interpreted as tradable (such as 
the Sixth Amendment entitlement to jury trial that is routinely nego-
tiated away in plea bargaining with the state), while others have been 
deemed inalienable (such as the Thirteenth Amendment entitlement 
against being enslaved).31 In the context of governing authority, however, 
instructions on whether a given legal entitlement may become the 
                                                                                                                           
compare U.S. Const., art. III (establishing federal judicial jurisdiction), with U.S. Const. 
amend. XI (establishing state sovereign immunity in federal court). 
 29. By this analysis, the substantive component of the entitlement is attached to a 
“remedy rule” that governs whether and under what circumstances the entitlement may 
be shifted. If the entitlement is treated as an item that the initial holder can retain or trade 
at will (such as the right to a jury trial), we say it is protected under a “property rule.” If 
another party may wrest the entitlement away regardless of the initial holder’s wishes, so 
long as compensation is paid (as eminent domain allows), it is protected by a “liability 
rule.” If the Constitution prohibits any exchange of the entitlement, requiring that it 
forever rest where it is initially allocated (such as the right against being enslaved), the 
entitlement is protected by an “inalienability rule.” See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1089–93 (1972) (setting forth this vocabulary to analyze private law 
entitlements). For analysis of constitutional grants of authority as entitlements, see Ryan, 
Tug of War, supra note 8, at 241–50 (using Calabresi and Melamed Cathedral framework to 
understand constitutional grants of authority as pairing of entitlement with remedy rule 
for vindication); Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1597 (“Individuals, for 
example, have familiar rights to due process and equal protection, to free speech and free 
exercise. But the test of the Constitution makes clear that institutions are also vested with 
distinct entitlements.”); Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 8, at 14–28 
(analyzing Cathedral framework); see also Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 822–23 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, Political Economy] 
(analyzing New York anticommandeering rule as entitlement to state governments). 
 30. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 241–50 (discussing Calabresi and 
Melamed’s Cathedral framework for analyzing entitlements). For example, the Fifth 
Amendment clarifies that the entitlement to private property is qualified by the state’s 
power of eminent domain to take it for public use, if just compensation is paid, but both 
the Sixth Amendment entitlement to jury trial and the Thirteenth Amendment entitle-
ment against being enslaved are textually silent on whether the right-holder may trade it 
(though right to jury trial is routinely traded in plea bargaining negotiations and right 
against enslavement is considered inalienable). 
 31. Id. 
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legitimate subject of negotiation are especially unclear.32 For this reason, 
understanding the rules of engagement between different institutional 
actors in the negotiation of constitutional allocations remains an 
important constitutional question, requiring more challenging inter-
pretive skill. 
The negotiated-structural-governance literature shows that just as 
individuals routinely use their constitutional entitlements as bargaining 
chips, so do governance institutions.33 Both Huq and I have argued that 
the private-law vocabulary of legal entitlements commands equal force in 
the public-law context of constitutional privileges and obligations, 
notwithstanding points of philosophical friction.34 Although the 
Supreme Court has generally disfavored structural-entitlement bargain-
ing,35 its practice is well established in the vertical-federalism plane of the 
Constitution’s separation of powers,36 and Huq now pushes the discourse 
forward by showing that it also exists along the horizontal plane.37 
Together with other authors from the new literature, we argue that this 
bargaining is not only inevitable, but can sometimes be desirable. 
The following review begins with scholarly analysis of the vertical 
plane of state-federal bargaining, including a smaller pool of work 
addressing the significance of horizontal bargaining among the states. It 
then addresses scholarship recognizing the horizontal plane of inter-
                                                                                                                           
 32. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. X (providing circular definition of states’ reserved 
powers). 
 33. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 241–50 (characterizing state–federal bar-
gaining as result of fact that “constitutional entitlements allocate jurisdictional authority to 
different governmental actors”); Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1 at 1598–99 
(identifying bourgeoning scholarship exploring possibility of “institutions such as states or 
federal branches might negotiate over their constitutional entitlements”); Ryan, 
Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 8, at 14–28 (analyzing application of Cathedral 
framework to federalism bargaining). 
 34. See Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1598–99 (finding limited study 
of institutional bargaining “puzzling” given “landmarks of structural constitutionalism 
often turn on whether institutions such as states and branches can negotiate over institu-
tional interests”); see also Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 244–50 (describing how 
private-law vocabulary “proves robust at describing the infrastructure of constitutional 
rules”); Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 8, at 14–28 (“[T]he dynamics of 
state–federal bargaining approximate marketplace bargaining even more closely than 
other forms of negotiation in which government is a party.”); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The 
Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1417, 1428 (2010) [hereinafter 
Vermeule, Invisible Hand] (distinguishing structural bargaining from private-law bargain-
ing in Coasean terms). 
 35. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing judicial constraints on ver-
tical federalism and horizontal separation-of-powers bargaining). 
 36. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 282, 271–314 (examining “conventional 
examples, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint policy-making negotiations” that 
represent vertical-federal bargaining); Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 8, at 24–
74 (providing taxonomy of “opportunities for federalism bargaining within the structure 
of specific constitutional and statutory laws”). 
 37. Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1600. 
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branch bargaining, to which Huq’s work makes its most important 
contributions. 
A. Vertical-Federalism Bargaining 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court’s treatment of structural 
bargaining along the vertical state–federal axis has been unenthusiastic. 
Beginning with the New Federalism revival of the 1990s, the expansive 
preemption cases that followed, and extending through the new spend-
ing power constraints of 2012, the thrust of the Court’s jurisprudence has 
been to limit the permissible scope of state-federal bargaining in zones of 
jurisdictional overlap.38 Nevertheless, while these decisions may have 
chilled the atmosphere for certain forms of intergovernmental bargain-
ing, they have hardly extinguished the enterprise, which continues to 
thrive in countless forms and forums. 
Because vertical separation-of-powers bargaining is more prevalent 
in practice, it is accordingly more recognized in the scholarly literature, 
documented extensively by my own work on state–federal bargaining. 
After early work documenting inherent structural uncertainty in the 
vertical allocation of authority,39 Federalism at the Cathedral analyzed the 
negotiation of structural entitlements in assessing the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of intergovernmental bargaining to resolve the ongoing 
nuclear waste management crisis.40 This work argued that the Court’s 
rejection of vertical structural bargaining undermined its valuable poten-
tial to cope with the very problems of jurisdictional overlap that other 
aspects of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence had exacerbated.41 
Negotiating Federalism then explored the full enterprise of state–federal 
bargaining, articulating a taxonomy of ten different ways that state and 
federal actors negotiate to resolve jurisdictional uncertainty and a theory 
for identifying when such bargaining qualifies as legitimate constitutional 
interpretation.42 More recent work analyzes the impact of the Court’s 
                                                                                                                           
 38. See Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 121–41 (discussing recent federalism and 
preemption jurisprudence). See generally Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 8 (discussing 
new spending power constraint). 
 39. Ryan, Seeking Checks and Balance, supra note 8, at 539–95. 
 40. Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 8, at 8 (“This Article explores how 
Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral framework can help us understand the inter-
jurisdictional gridlock that has arisen under the New Federalism Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence in infrastructural terms—and more importantly, how to resolve it at the 
infrastructure level.”). 
 41. Id. at 7 (arguing “in an effort to make its own rhetorical point about federalism,” 
Supreme Court denied Congress authority to bind state participation in nuclear waste 
management plan even where state officials had waived opposition on Tenth Amendment 
grounds during voluntary bargaining with federal counterparts). 
 42. Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 8, at 6 (“Incorporating general 
bargaining principles of mutual consent and the procedural application of core federalism 
values, negotiated governance opens possibilities for filling interpretive gaps in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence or congressional legislation. This Article. . . provides the 
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new spending power constraints on vertical bargaining within discrete 
programs of cooperative federalism,43 and the specific forums for nego-
tiation and exchange that have been developed within various statutory 
programs of environmental law.44 
Building on much of this early work, my recent book, Federalism and 
the Tug of War Within, sets forth an overarching model of Balanced 
Federalism that supports many of the structural conclusions that Huq 
separately reaches in the horizontal plane. Balanced-Federalism theory 
provides clearer justification for the ways in which the interpretation and 
allocation of contested constitutional authority is already mediated 
through various forms of balancing, compromise, and negotiation—
among all branches at all levels of government.45 As described in this 
book, Balanced Federalism offers a series of innovations to bring judicial, 
legislative, and executive efforts to manage federalism conflicts into more 
fully theorized focus, leveraging the functional capacities of the three 
branches of government to implement structural directives in ways that 
will most faithfully advance the good-governance values that underlie 
federalism.46 
Like Huq, I argue for greater judicial deference to political 
bargaining—especially bargaining that procedurally advances the good-
governance values that federalism is designed to yield.47 Extrapolating 
them from the legislative history of the American Constitutional 
Convention, later Supreme Court interpretations, congressional and 
executive pronouncements, and the academic literature, this work iden-
tifies the foundational federalism values as: (1) checks and balances be-
tween opposing centers of power that protect individuals from overreach 
or abdication by either, (2) transparency and accountability that enables 
meaningful democratic participation, (3) autonomy to foster diversity 
and innovation, and (4) the regulatory problem-solving synergy that 
federalism enables between the unique governance capacities of local 
and national actors for coping with problems that neither can resolve 
alone.48 Limited judicial review is available to police for bargaining 
                                                                                                                           
first recognition that bilateral federalism bargaining is itself a means of interpreting the 
Constitution.”). 
 43. Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 8, at 1008 (arguing “inquiry sheds light not 
only on environmental law after Sebelius, but also on the many other realms of American 
governance that engage spending-power bargaining, such as public education partner-
ships, civil rights law, social service programs, and civic infrastructure”). 
 44. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8 (manuscript 
at 23–40) (describing environmental law’s mechanisms for dealing with federalism 
challenges of jurisdictional separation and unstructured overlap). 
 45. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at xi–xii, 181–214, 265–70, 339–67. 
 46. Id. at xi–xii. 
 47. Id. at 34–67. 
 48. Id. For more on the foundational good-governance values that American fed-
eralism is designed to advance, see generally id. at 7–67 (drawing on work in Ryan, 
Seeking Checks and Balance, supra note 8, to explain how “polities turn to federalism to 
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abuses,49 but if the bargaining process is conducted in a manner that is 
consistent with the fundamental federalism values, then the results 
warrant deference as a legitimate means of allocating contested consti-
tutional authority: 
Bargaining that procedurally safeguards rights, enhances 
participation, fosters innovation, and harnesses interjuris-
dictional synergy accomplishes what federalism is designed to 
do—and what federalism interpretation is ultimately for. As 
such, it warrants interpretive deference from a reviewing court, 
or any branch actor interrogating the result. Of course, not all 
federalism bargaining will do so. Bargaining that allocates 
authority through processes that weaken rights, threaten 
democratic participation, undermine innovation, and frustrate 
problem-solving is not consistent with federalism values, and 
warrants no interpretive deference. The more consistency with 
these values of good governing process, the more interpretive 
deference is warranted; the less procedural consistency with 
these values, the less interpretive deference is warranted.50 
When they are working properly, the structural constraints that bilateral 
bargaining impose on state and federal actors enable the negotiating 
parties to actualize federalism’s core principles more faithfully than is 
often possible through unilateral judicial or legislative interpretation: 
The structural safeguards of bilateral exchange ensure that the 
negotiated balance reflects the input of both national and local 
participants. Bargaining that fully satisfies the procedural 
criteria [of bargaining legitimacy, checks, transparency, auton-
omy, and synergy] advances federalism by giving expression to 
its core values as a procedural matter, and by leveraging the 
unique capacity that all governmental actors bring to federalism 
                                                                                                                           
promote a set of governance values that they hope federalism will help yield”). See also 
Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7–10 & 
n.41) (adding more explicit consideration of value of centralized authority, embedded 
here within value of problem-solving synergy). 
 49. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 353 (“In contrast to previous process-based 
proposals, judicial oversight of federalism bargaining is available but limited . . . . 
Outcomes challenged on federalism grounds are assessed for procedure before substance; 
if the bargaining process satisfies the criteria, then the court defers to the substance of the 
negotiated result.”). This proposal is “designed to prevent the judiciary from invalidating 
the results of challenged federalism bargaining that is ultimately faithful to federalism 
values, even if it does so in ways vulnerable to traditional judicial doctrine,” but “it does 
not provide any new grounds for challenging federalism bargaining in court. The proposal 
thus provides a new defense against negotiated federalism challenges without offering 
additional sources of doctrinal challenge—reducing the overall impact of judicial con-
straints while preserving courts’ ability to police for abuses.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 349; see also id. at 347 (“Constitutional federalism sets the structural 
baselines through which good governance values will be realized in practice, but con-
troversial substantive outcomes are ultimately debated in policy spheres beyond the reach 
of the federalism project. For that reason, this inquiry stops short of deciphering between 
rightly and wrongly decided outcomes in individual cases. Instead, it deciphers between 
rightly and wrongly conducted processes.” (emphasis added)). 
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interpretation and implementation . . . . In contrast to the 
judicial interpretive supremacy implied by [most federalism 
doctrine], the proposal demonstrates instances in which the 
very process of intergovernmental bargaining proves more able 
to preserve constitutional values than judicial or legislative 
decisions alone.51 
Balanced Federalism recognizes the primary role of vertical bargaining 
to allocate contested authority in the conduct of federalism-sensitive 
governance,52 and it advocates for horizontal bargaining among the 
three branches to appropriately shift authority for resolving distinct 
interpretive dilemmas to the branch possessing the institutional capacity 
best suited for the task.53 
Together with other work providing theoretical support for fuller 
analysis of negotiated governance, this research has fueled a new wave of 
scholarship acknowledging the importance of bargaining in state–federal 
relations. The new phalanx of bargaining-literate federalism work builds 
on the early political-safeguards literature of Herbert Wechsler,54 Jesse 
Choper,55 and, more recently, Larry Kramer.56 It advances on earlier 
state–federal integration work by Morton Grodzins,57 Daniel Elazar,58 and 
others, including the insights from more recent dynamic-federalism 
                                                                                                                           
 51. Id. at 367. 
 52. See generally id. at 265–338 (exploring enterprise of state–federal bargaining as 
means of allocating contested authority). 
 53. See id. at 368–72 (encouraging horizontal bargaining as means of “draw[ing] on 
the specialized capacity of each branch of government”); see also id. at 181–214 (explor-
ing potential for judicial capacity to resolve federalism dilemmas); id. at 215–65 (discuss-
ing circumstances in which legislative capacity outperforms judicial capacity); id. at 339–67 
(proposing differentiated interpretive responsibilities among political and judicial 
branches). 
 54. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
543, 548 (1954) (arguing judicially enforceable federalism constraints are unnecessary 
because state-elected congressional representatives will protect state interests within fed-
eral political process). 
 55. See Choper, supra note 13, at 175–76 (1980) (differentiating constitutional pro-
tections for individual rights and structural federalism). 
 56. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 290 (2000) (concluding “[a]ctive judicial intervention 
to protect the states from Congress is consistent with neither the original understanding 
nor with more than two centuries of practice”). 
 57. See Morton Grodzins, The American System 8, 60–68 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 2d ed. 
1984) (describing cooperative federalism model of integrated state–federal governance in 
realms of jurisdictional overlap). 
 58. See Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in Competition Among States and 
Local Governments 65, 67–68 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) (providing 
comprehensive analysis of state–federal relations within cooperative federalism model). 
See generally Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States 1–2 (3d ed. 
1966) (arguing essence of federalism is sharing of governance responsibilities among 
various levels through political partnerships that make it impossible to speak of fully 
separated regulatory roles). 
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scholarship by Erwin Chemerinsky,59 Robert Schapiro,60 Ed Rubin and 
Malcolm Feeley,61 Gillian Metzger,62 Judith Resnik,63 Alison LaCroix,64 
Edward Purcell,65 and John Nugent.66 
In the vanguard, Heather Gerken argues that negotiation and 
exchange among local, state, and federal actors is the critical means by 
which the American federal system fosters a strong national democracy.67 
Her work addresses the transformative dynamics of state and local 
                                                                                                                           
 59. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 
21st Century (2008) (challenging traditional conception of federalism as limit on federal 
power and arguing for alternative version of federalism as empowerment of government at 
all levels). 
 60. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights (2009) (discussing contemporary federalism and arguing rights are 
best protected by promoting dynamic interaction of state and federal governments). 
 61. See generally Malcolm Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and 
Tragic Compromise (2008) (exploring historic and modern ambiguities of federalism and 
its salience to political identity). 
 62. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 6–7 (2011) (explaining federalism factors in three Supreme Court preemption 
decisions as mechanisms for enhancing federal agency performance rather than as 
principle worth pursuing in its own right). 
 63. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 
111 Yale L.J. 619, 619–25 (2001) (critiquing categorical federalism in light of empirical 
and normative perspectives and proposing “multi-faceted federalism” alternative). 
 64. See generally Alison L. Lacroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 
(2010) (arguing paradigm-shifting idea of federalism—that multiple independent levels of 
government could exist fruitfully within a single polity—was a foundational principle and 
core aspiration of American political enterprise). 
 65. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American 
Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry (2007) (arguing Constitution created 
essential core structure of interrelated elements that allows for ongoing dynamic change). 
 66. See generally John Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their 
Interests in National Policymaking (2009) (exploring how states successfully exert 
influence over federal action within cooperative federalism). 
 67. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
Yale L.J 1889, 1892–93 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, New Nationalism] (“It is possible to 
imagine federalism integrating rather than dividing national policy.”); Heather K. Gerken, 
The Federalis(m) Society, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 941, 942–45 (2013) (arguing 
“[c]ooperative federalism is where the action is” and “role that states play in so-called 
‘cooperative federalism’ regimes gives them a great of influence to interpret, influence, 
even resist federal mandates”); Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 Yale L.J. 
1958, 1977–78 (2014) (arguing federalism is powerful means with which to integrate 
dissenters and minorities into national democratic system); Heather K. Gerken, The 
Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
33–44 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Foreword] (discussing benefits of “uncooperative 
dimensions of ‘cooperative federalism’”); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1258–60 (2009) (explaining 
frequent and useful dynamics of “uncooperative federalism,” in which state and local 
actors resist federal preferences). 
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resistance within federalism relationships,68 the significance of multijuris-
dictional governance dynamics throughout the jurisdictional spectrum,69 
and the increasingly outmoded rhetorical struggle between proponents 
of more centralized and devolved governance.70 Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s 
work similarly emphasizes contested and negotiated integration between 
state and federal authority as a means of enhancing interests on both 
sides.71 She argues that the states’ notably non-passive role in coad-
ministering federal statutes renders them tantamount to a fourth 
executive branch, merging horizontal and vertical separation-of-powers 
perspectives.72 
Other scholars have explored the significance of intergovernmental 
bargaining and negotiated federalism with even greater specificity. Abbe 
Gluck argues that intergovernmental negotiation within cooperative 
federalism regimes is where the business of federalism is principally 
conducted in the modern era, although federalism doctrine has yet to 
recognize this.73 Cristina Rodríguez’s scholarship recognizes federalism 
as the framework through which essential intergovernmental relations 
are negotiated, with critical significance for resolving divisive national 
                                                                                                                           
 68. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 67, at 1258–60 (arguing “sensible 
account of federalism ought to recognize that uncooperative federalism occurs in practice 
and to acknowledge that there are values associated with the phenomenon”). 
 69. Gerken, Foreword, supra note 67, at 21–25. 
 70. Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 67, at 1892–94. 
 71. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 460–64 (2012) (arguing states may check federal executive in era 
of expansive executive power and do so as champions of Congress, both relying on 
congressionally conferred authority and casting themselves as Congress’s faithful agents); 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The 
Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1920, 1922–23 (2014) [hereinafter Bulman-
Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process] (arguing state–federal integration paradoxically 
advances state autonomy and “administration and politics” should be embraced as 
“transformative, rather than preservative, of American federalism”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1078–82 (2014) (arguing states check federal 
government by channeling political conflict through federalism’s institutional framework); 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 67, at 1258–60 (analyzing “uncooperative 
federalism”).  
 72. Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process, supra note 71, at 1922, 1934–35. 
 73. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1996, 1998–2002 
(2014) [hereinafter, Gluck, Our [National] Federalism] (criticizing law governing state–
federal interactions in cooperative federalism programs as “doctrinal muddle,” in part 
because Supreme Court has failed to recognize these interactions as epicenter of modern 
federalism); see also Gluck, Federal Statutes, supra note 21, at 1749–1752 (presenting 
health-reform legislation as example of intergovernmental negotiation and cooperative 
federalism); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1901–06 (2011) (analyzing state–federal 
interactions in context of Erie doctrine); Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 21, 
at 537–45 (analyzing interplay between state and federal governments applying federal 
laws through lens of Affordable Care Act). 
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policy debates.74 Samuel Bagenstos has especially focused on spending 
power bargaining as a tool of federalism-sensitive governance, including 
state–federal negotiation of executive waivers of federal statutory 
provisions that might otherwise bind states.75 New work by Bridget Fahey 
explores how the technical mechanics of negotiated governance can 
influence the allocation of state and federal power, arguing that consent 
procedures within programs of cooperative federalism can meaningfully 
influence state choices.76 
Some federalism scholars have also addressed the significance of 
horizontal bargaining among state actors. For example, Heather Gerken 
and Ari Holtzblatt explore federalism-significant relationships among the 
states, arguing that spillovers in the horizontal-federalism context can be 
just as important as they are in the vertical context in prodding political 
actors to negotiate acceptable interjurisdictional compromises.77 Mean-
while, Abigail Moncrieff draws on the vocabulary of law and economics 
in her proposed hybrid system of “cost–benefit federalism,” in which 
states enter Coasean compacts with one another to maximize both 
regulatory efficiency and individual liberty.78 Jim Rossi discusses 
government-relations bargaining in the context of deregulation, 
emphasizing the role of private bargaining with governmental bodies, 
but also observing the dynamics of state–federal bargaining in zones of 
regulatory overlap.79 
                                                                                                                           
 74. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: 
Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 Yale L.J. 2094, 2099 (2014) (noting previous 
work has explored how “overlapping political communities in our body politic negotiate 
with one another to address matters of national concern”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The 
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 571–73 (2008) 
(discussing federal–state–local dynamic through lens of immigration regulation). 
 75. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending 
Clause After NFIB, 101 Geo. L.J. 861, 864–65 (2013) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Anti-
Leveraging] (analyzing Court’s new judicially enforceable constraint on spending power 
bargaining); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in 
The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and its Implications 227, 227–44 
(Gillian Metzger et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter, Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver] (arguing 
increased state leverage after new spending power doctrine will likely encourage 
negotiation of more executive waivers of statutory requirements). 
 76. See Bridget Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 Harv. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing consent procedures “do more than operate as processes for registering state 
consent; many also shape how states internally discuss, deliberate, and decide whether to 
join federal programs”). 
 77. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal 
Federalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 63 (2014). 
 78. See Moncrieff, supra note 21, at 308 (advocating formula for allocating authority 
that “optimizes the benefits of regulatory efficiency within the constraint of libertarian 
costs”). 
 79. See Jim Rossi, Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law 172–232 (2005) (“A 
government relations bargaining approach to economic regulation recognizes how public 
law is important for state and local regulation, especially in deregulated markets.”). 
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It is important to note that this new wave of scholarship on vertical 
integration stands in contrast to a canon of older federalism scholarship 
that generally follows from one of two competing premises, the first more 
committed to the ideals of jurisdictional separation as a means of 
protecting state sovereignty, and the second emphasizing the importance 
of unencumbered central authority to advance important national 
goals.80 The traditional schools advocating for more devolution and 
centralization continue to produce important scholarly perspectives.81 
Nevertheless, it is no longer possible to discuss the vertical allocation of 
constitutional authority without considering the extent to which it is 
already characterized by negotiation around the uncertain boundaries 
that have always complicated federalism. 
B. Horizontal Interbranch Bargaining 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of horizontal separation-of-powers 
bargaining has been even less enthusiastic than its treatment of vertical 
structural bargaining.82 The zones of jurisdictional overlap between the 
three branches of government are also probably smaller than the vast 
interjurisdictional gray area spanning recognized areas of state and 
federal regulatory concern. For these reasons, the extent of horizontal 
separation-of-powers bargaining appears smaller than its vertical 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See, e.g., Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at xxvi (discussing two traditional 
schools of federalism theory); Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 25 
(manuscript at 1–2) (discussing conflict among different federalism schools of thought); 
Gerken, Foreword, supra note 67, at 11–21 (providing contemporary intellectual history of 
federalism debates). 
 81. For works advocating for greater decentralization, see, e.g., Michael S. Greve, The 
Upside-Down Constitution 5 (2012) (“[O]ur federalism of cartels and consociation is 
disconnected from, and indeed antithetical to, the Constitution’s competitive structure 
and logic.”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 181, 181–82 (1998) (advocating for competitive federalism and stressing 
importance of executive-branch insulation to federalism ideals); Hills, Political Economy, 
supra note 29, at 850–51 (rejecting “notion of dual federalism or separate and distinct 
spheres” as incompatible with “intergovernmental reality of the United States”); Ilya 
Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, in NOMOS LV: Federalism and 
Subsidiarity 83, 92–93 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (arguing 
decentralization has advantage of letting jurisdictions compete for individuals by offering 
attractive policy regimes); Ernest Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1, 163–65 (2004) (arguing Court should “reorient federal doctrine toward 
concerns about state autonomy” and “de-emphasize state sovereign immunity”). Others 
scholars remain unpersuaded about decentralization. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & 
Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise 17–18 (2008) 
(noting decentralization is “distinctly different from federalism”); Edward L. Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 
908–14 (1994) (“The notion that an admittedly valid national policy is best implemented 
by decentralizing its administration cannot support either the rhetoric of federalism or the 
remedy of judicial intervention.”). 
 82. See Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1657–63 (discussing Chadha, 
Bowsher, and other judicial hostility to horizontal separation-of-powers bargaining). 
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counterpart, and the corresponding literature is correspondingly smaller, 
newer, and less harmonious. 
Reflecting the federalism literature’s focus on institutional capacity, 
Mark Rosen argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is better 
implemented by legislative action than judicial interpretation because 
legislative institutions possess institutional advantages for negotiating 
interstate conflict prospectively and comprehensively.83 Enrique Guerra-
Pujol proposes structural bargaining that even Huq finds unrealistic, 
controversially proposing that federal, state, and even private actors 
compete for unclaimed powers through decentralized auction mech-
anisms and secondary markets.84 Meanwhile, Adrian Vermeule acknow-
ledges the reality and inevitability of horizontal structural bargaining, but 
argues that it is bad for governance, creating unique transaction costs in 
the public sphere that lead to undesirable and inefficient outcomes.85 
Similarly, Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison argue that the judiciary 
should police interbranch boundaries against bargaining, critiquing the 
Madisonian assertion that the political branches will effectively check one 
another by vying for power.86 
Nevertheless, while crediting earlier analysis by John McGinnis,87 
Huq’s new work, Negotiating the Structural Constitution, is the first sustained 
                                                                                                                           
 83. Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in Determining What Full Faith and 
Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 7, 22 (2010) 
(“[L]egislatures are better structured than courts to undertake the decision making 
process that informs intelligent multilateralist solutions.”). 
 84. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Coase and the Constitution: A New Approach to 
Federalism, 14 Rich. J.L. & Pub. Int. 593, 602 (2011) (proposing “federalism markets” that 
would not require institutions to auction “existing powers or functions” but which would 
allocate “[a]ll new powers . . . through decentralized auction mechanisms”). 
 85. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 991, 1010–15 (2008) (addressing social costs and benefits to “showdowns”—
protracted and costly battle to assert constitutional authority); Vermeule, Invisible Hand, 
supra note 34, at 1428 (noting horizontal structural bargaining does not occur in Coasean 
vacuum); Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects 
and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 24–28 (2009) (“Institutions will bear costs and 
enjoy benefits from checking the ambitions of other institutions, but nothing necessarily 
aligns those institutional costs and benefits of checking with social costs and benefits.”); 
see also Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 38–64 (2011) (discussing 
structural Constitution). 
 86. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation 
of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 436–38 (2012) (arguing in favor of judicial review of 
separation-of-powers questions though acknowledging courts cannot unilaterally defend 
powers of political branches that acquiesce); see also Vermeule, Invisible Hand, supra note 
34, at 1427–28 (arguing Madisonian competition cannot regulate separation of powers 
because it fails to “align[] the ‘private’ costs and benefits to institutions with social costs 
and benefits”). 
 87. John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and 
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1993, at 293, 295–99 (describing “model premised on the idea 
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treatment of horizontal structural bargaining as a legitimate institutional 
enterprise. The article builds on Huq’s prior scholarly focus on hori-
zontal and vertical separation-of-powers issues, with special interest in 
horizontal conflicts between the executive branch and the legislative and 
judicial branches.88 In earlier work, he generally advocates for more 
limited judicial review of structural constitutional questions,89 while 
acknowledging that limited review may be appropriate for separation-of-
powers challenges brought by harmed institutional actors.90 His new 
article demonstrates that horizontal structural bargaining (or “intra-
mural bargaining”) is not only unavoidable but potentially beneficial, 
and that it should be allowed to proceed with minimal judicial review 
except as needed to curtail a select set of foreseeable harms: 
Intermural bargaining of some sort is both inevitable and 
desirable for two reasons. First, spillover effects and the absence 
of complete specification of constitutional entitlements both 
make some mechanism to resolve boundary disputes unavoid-
able. Bargaining is the obvious solution, at least given a judicial-
review regime that requires concrete cases and controversies. 
Second, the Constitution is not a homeostatic system, but an 
evolutionary one. The inevitable translation of constitutional 
concepts forward in time—against the backdrop of shifting 
institutional, social, and economic circumstances—necessarily 
generates intermural conflicts, even when the initial text has 
been completely specified. Bargaining is needed to resolve 
these conflicts in the first instance. 91 
Huq explains that the negotiation of entitlements among governing 
institutions is inevitable because the text of the Constitution leaves gaps 
of uncertainty and that it is desirable as a means of resolving spillover 
areas between clearer realms of executive and legislative authority.92 
Taking on the conventional arguments against horizontal bargaining, he 
argues that the political branches are better positioned than the courts to 
resolve boundary disputes because they possess superior tools of prospec-
tive, comprehensive, and adaptive governing capacity.93 He refutes the 
                                                                                                                           
that branches may shape separation of powers doctrine through bargains and accom-
modation to advance their mutual institutional interests”). 
 88. See supra note 3 (citing Huq’s previous work). 
 89. E.g., Huq, Logic of Collective Action, supra note 3, at 223 (arguing heterogeneity 
of collective-action dynamics in American federalism may deter judicial intervention); 
Huq, Removal as Political Question, supra note 3, at 6 (“[J]udicial enforcement of pres-
idential removal authority will not reliably promote presidential control or democratic 
accountability.”); Huq, Standing, supra note 3, at 1440 (arguing federal courts should not 
permit individual litigants who seek to enforce certain constitutional principles to obtain 
relief on federalism grounds). 
 90. See Huq, Standing, supra note 3, at 1440 (arguing institutions should seek to 
enforce institutional principles themselves rather than relying on individual litigants). 
 91. Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1656–57. 
 92. Id. at 1657–63. 
 93. Id. at 1683–86. 
2015] NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM 23 
 
assertion that political bargaining will create more undesirable instability 
in comparison with judicial review, convincingly pointing to the notori-
ous instability of the Court’s own separation-of-powers jurisprudence over 
time.94 Among his most provocative claims is that separation-of-powers 
doctrines have been exaggerated as a means of preventing tyranny, and 
should be rejected as a formalistic basis on which to oppose intramural 
bargaining.95 
Huq draws compellingly on pre-ratification legislative history to 
advance his argument, noting that James Madison had famously 
proposed that the Constitution’s allocation of power among the three 
branches be explicitly defined as exclusive.96 He suggests that the 
Framers’ rejection of Madison’s proposal provides evidence that the 
default entitlements conferred in the Constitution should be considered 
nonexclusive, and therefore open to later negotiation through intra-
mural bargaining: 
It may be tempting to assume that the textual vesting of 
entitlements should be read as inviolate, so that Congress could 
never bargain away a sliver of legislative power, the executive 
could not trade on its veto, and the states could not negotiate 
away fragments of their sovereignty. But the text of the 
Constitution contains no rule barring any and all bargaining 
over institutional powers . . . . Nor is there a negative impli-
cation to be drawn from the absence of positive authorization of 
intermural bargaining. To the contrary, the immediate 
historical context of ratification supports a favorable view of 
negotiation over the structural constitution. Madison’s proposal 
to the first Congress that the Constitution’s distribution of 
power among the branches be read as exclusive, precluding any 
innovations by later generations, was passed by the House but 
failed in the Senate for now-unknown reasons. The fact that 
Madison saw a need for such a proposal suggests that the 
distribution of regulatory allotments between the branches was 
not exclusive or immutable. The rejection of Madison’s pro-
posal to fix those entitlements powerfully suggests that the 
Constitution’s then-extant textual distribution of institutional 
authorities now should be read as a set of default entitlements 
subject to alteration by later political-branch negotiation.97 
He shows how the decline of the nondelegation doctrine has facilitated a 
fuller breadth of intramural bargaining, and argues that the doctrinal 
rules constraining structural bargaining along the horizontal axis should 
                                                                                                                           
 94. Id. at 1676. 
 95. Id. at 1681–82. 
 96. Id. at 1649. 
 97. Id. He then points to other examples in which the Constitution creates default 
rules open to later alternation, including Article III’s default rule on federal courts, re-
quiring the existence of the Supreme Court at a minimum but allowing for other inferior 
federal courts by subsequent congressional establishment. Id. at 1649–51. 
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be relaxed to allow the kind of bargaining that has become more 
commonplace along the vertical-federalism axis. He acknowledges that 
political bargaining may enable troubling externalities and “paternalism-
warranting internalities” that might accompany the overaccumulation of 
power in the executive branch, but concludes that these problems are 
still best managed through the political process, rather than judicial 
review.98 
III. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE 
Scholars within the discourse are all arriving at their understanding 
of negotiated structural governance through different disciplinary 
prisms, often using different analytical tools. For example, whereas 
Professor Huq writes from the law-and-economics perspective, my work 
relies more on the vocabulary of negotiation theory, while Gerken’s work 
is grounded in political theory, and so on. Nevertheless, much of the 
work is groping toward similar underlying ideas. Overall, three general 
themes emerge from the new literature: (1) structural bargaining is inev-
itable in realms of constitutional ambiguity, (2) bargaining is desirable to 
fill interpretive gaps poorly suited to judicial capacity, (3) judicial review 
should be limited except where necessary to prevent bargaining abuses 
that undermine the legitimacy of the process. Differences include the 
means by which scholars evaluate structural bargaining, and related 
scholarly dissensus over process- and principle-oriented constitutional 
analyses. 
A. Structural Bargaining Is Inevitable  
Scholars of negotiated structural governance generally agree that 
institutional bargaining is inevitable in the absence of clear constitutional 
entitlements. All of the authors previously cited acknowledge that struc-
tural bargaining takes place among the major institutions of governance, 
usually in response to uncertainty about which institutional actor is 
constitutionally privileged in a given context.99 For example, Professor 
                                                                                                                           
 98. Id. at 1615. 
 99. See supra Part II (citing various authors who acknowledge structural bargaining 
takes place). For a snapshot of the literature discussing state–federal bargaining as a fact of 
American governance, see, e.g., Bagenstos, Anti-Leveraging, supra note 75, at 876, 921 
(reviewing bargaining under Affordable Care Act); Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver, supra 
note 75, at 1 (same); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 86, at 414, 432 (examining 
institutional acquiescence and reality of how political branches actually interact); Fahey, 
supra note 76 (manuscript at 5) (discussing how consent procedures defining manner in 
which states may elect to participate within programs of cooperative federalism channel 
deliberation and formation of state preferences); Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 77, at 
68–69 (arguing judicial review is more practical than political solutions in state-versus-state 
disputes); Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 73, at 1999 (discussing judicial 
federalism and bargaining concerns); Moncrieff, supra note 21, at 302 (discussing states’ 
ability to enter into regulatory compacts); Rodríguez, supra note 74, at 1 (arguing 
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Rodríguez argues that the framework the Constitution creates for nego-
tiation is the very thing that makes it possible to surmount the formid-
able obstacles to good structural governance.100 She observes that “[t]he 
contours of our federal system are under constant negotiation, as 
governments construct the scope of one another’s interests and powers 
while pursuing their agendas.”101 Even Professor Vermeule, who disfavors 
horizontal structural bargaining, openly acknowledges it: “The legis-
lature, President, and judiciary do bargain repeatedly over similar issues, 
and this produces something that vaguely resembles a marketplace for 
policies.”102 Bradley and Morrison, who are similarly dubious of structural 
negotiation, acknowledge the fact of interbranch agreements to shift 
authority beyond constitutional defaults.103 
In the vertical context, my own work presents a thickly descriptive 
account of intergovernmental bargaining as a pragmatic response to ver-
tical jurisdictional uncertainty, beginning with the observation that: 
[I]ntergovernmental bargaining offer[s] a means of 
understanding the relationship between state and federal power 
that differs from the stylized model of zero-sum federalism that 
has dominated the discourse to this point, emphasizing winner-
takes-all antagonism within bitter jurisdictional competi-
tion . . . . But countless real-world examples show that the 
boundary between state and federal authority is actually 
negotiated on scales large and small, and on a continual basis. 
Working in a dizzying array of regulatory contexts, state and 
federal actors negotiate over both the allocation of policy-
making entitlements and the substantive terms of the mandates 
policy making will impose. [Bargaining] takes place both in 
realms plagued by legal uncertainty about whose jurisdiction 
trumps, and in realms unsettled by uncertainty over whose 
decision should trump, regardless of legal supremacy. Recon-
ceptualizing the relationship between state and federal power as 
one heavily mediated by negotiation demonstrates how feder-
alism practice departs from the rhetoric, and offers hope for 
moving beyond the paralyzing features of the zero-sum 
discourse.104 
                                                                                                                           
federalism does not consist of fixed relationships but instead has its parameters subject to 
negotiation by relevant actors), Rosen, supra note 83, at 34 (discussing implicit bargaining 
inherent in DOMA context). 
 100. Rodríguez, supra note 74, at 2114. 
 101. Id. at 2094. 
 102. Vermeuele, Invisible Hand, supra note 34, at 1428. 
 103. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 86, at 414, 432 (“[A] practice by one branch of 
government that implicates the prerogatives of another branch gains constitutional 
legitimacy only if the other branch can be deemed to have ‘acquiesced’ in the practice 
over time.”). 
 104. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 267–68; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra 
note 8, at 4–5. The work goes on to demonstrate ten different forms of state–federal 
bargaining, some of which respond directly to constitutional uncertainty and others to 
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As theorists became mired in debate over how to resolve 
intergovernmental regulatory competition, I explain, the actual regulat-
ors working in vertically contested contexts “learned to confront juris-
dictional uncertainty simply by negotiating through it.”105 
Negotiated-governance scholars further agree that the constitutional 
vagueness that engenders structural bargaining is equally inevitable, 
because the text of the Constitution cannot account for every possible 
ambiguity. Borrowing from the vocabulary of property law, Professor Huq 
explains the resulting problem as one of constitutional “spillovers”, or 
realms of law in which the exercise of constitutionally legitimate author-
ity by one institutional actor nevertheless encroaches upon the exercise 
of legitimate authority by another institutional actor.106 He analogizes to 
real property law, which often wrestles with the question of where to 
assign the costs of mitigating spillover effects, but notes that the con-
stitutional context differs because there is usually no “natural or intuitive 
answer.”107 
Demonstrating spillovers among the jurisdictional boundaries 
between the three branches of government, Huq identifies the horizon-
tal ambiguity implied by the Court’s removal jurisprudence, which seeks 
to resolve overlap between the President’s power to take care that the 
laws are enforced and Congress’s Necessary and Proper power to struc-
ture the executive branch.108 The Court’s separation-of-powers jurispru-
dence showcases constitutional spillovers even more directly, requiring 
judicial distinctions between legislative and executive function in cases 
                                                                                                                           
political uncertainty in the shadow of constitutional uncertainty. Ryan, Tug of War, supra 
note 8, at 282; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 8, at 26–27 (organizing 
ten identified ways state and federal actors negotiate into “three overarching categories of 
conventional examples, negotiations to allocate authority, and joint policy-making 
negotiations”). 
 105. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 266–67; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra 
note 8, at 5. 
 106. Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1657 (explaining boundaries of 
institutional entitlements are unclear, and “Constitution . . . does not resolve all potential 
questions concerning the allocation of endogenously defined entitlements”). 
 107. Id. (“As in real property, questions about how to assign the costs of mitigating 
spillover effects arise. Unlike in the real-property context, however, the allocation of 
spillover-related costs will often lack a natural and intuitive answer. Instead, the resolution 
of such costs is best achieved through intermural bargaining . . . .”). Citing Coasean 
bargaining theory, he observes that sometimes when “the use of one entitlement has a 
spillover effect on the use of another entitlement, there is no obvious, natural, or inev-
itable way to parcel out the entitlements. It is simply ‘not useful to speak of one party to an 
externality as being the cause of any problem of incompatible demands.’” Id. at 1658 
(quoting Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 
54 J.L. & Econ. S77, S95 (2011)). 
 108. Id. at 1660 (“To analyze removal disputes as raising solely the powers of one or 
the other elected branch is to gloss over the question of how institutional borders are to 
be drawn when the text engenders overlap.”). 
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interpreting the legislative veto, line-item veto, lockbox rules, and seque-
ster.109 Yet, as Huq explains, 
The concepts of “legislative” and “executive” cannot be applied 
to the complexities of observed governance in ways that yield 
resolving clarity. As Justice Stevens recognized in his Bowsher 
concurrence, “governmental power cannot always be readily 
characterized with only one of . . . three labels.” . . . Efforts by 
the Court to determine whether and how to separate govern-
ment functions have dominated debates in constitutional theory 
since the Founding. Indeed, for all the weaknesses of his 
separation-of-powers theory, Madison must be credited with 
anticipating the pervasiveness of spillovers between branches. In 
a flash of gloomy candor, Madison in The Federalist No. 37 
observed that “no skill in the science of government has yet 
been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, 
[the] three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary.” Anti-Federalist opponents of ratification concurred, 
but took exception to the “vague and inexplicit” boundaries 
between branches.110 
As Huq concludes, “[a]bsent some novel theoretical account of how to 
decompose the Constitution into clear and distinct elementary 
particles—an account that eluded the Founders—boundary disputes 
between branches and between governments recognized in the Con-
stitution will remain pervasive.”111 
My own work characterizes the problem of vertical constitutional 
uncertainty as one of regulatory overlap in a “gray area” of interjuris-
dictional concern, where both state and federal actors have simul-
taneously legitimate regulatory interests or obligations. Federalism and the 
Tug of War Within derives this problem from the three grammatical 
clauses of the Tenth Amendment,112 which effectively establish that the 
Constitution (1) delegates some powers to the national government, (2) 
prohibits some to the states, and (3) reserves those that fit in neither of 
these two categories to the states (or perhaps the people).113 However, it 
explains, “neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause nor 
any other provision in the Constitution decisively resolves whether there 
may also be regulatory spaces in which both the states and the federal 
government may operate,” if they have not been otherwise assigned by 
unambiguous limitation or preemption.114 It is this realm of jurisdictional 
overlap that generates so much uncertainty in federalism, but the Consti-
tution itself provides no answer: 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Id. at 1661. 
 110. Id. at 1661–62 (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 1662. 
 112. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
 113. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 10–11. 
 114. Id. 
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Drawing the conclusion that the Constitution allows for 
overlapping regulatory space requires an interpretive leap, but 
so does the extrapolation of mutually exclusive spheres of au-
thority. Either conclusion demands application of some exog-
enous theory about what American federalism means, or what, 
in essence, federalism is for. The fact that we have relied on one 
theory or another to resolve the matter—in ways that may 
eventually come to seem obvious if only by virtue of their 
repetition—does not negate the role of federalism theory in 
getting us to that interpretive point. And when the Constitution 
leaves open multiple possibilities, interpretive choices are 
inevitable.115 
Federalism theory is therefore critical to the interpretive enterprise; 
without it, there is simply no way forward. And for this reason, the un-
folding literature rightly demands that we revisit the conclusory analyses 
of previous federalism theory with tempered skepticism. 
B. Structural Bargaining Can Be Desirable 
A second emerging theme among the literature is that such 
bargaining is not only inevitable, it can also be desirable—or at least the 
best choice among alternatives. With some dissenters, most authors argue 
that structural bargaining by the political branches is especially valuable 
when the decisionmaking called for is better matched to political-
governance capacity than the more limited judicial skillset. As Professor 
Rosen observes in the interbranch context, the primary institutional 
advantage of legislative action is that, unlike the Supreme Court, 
Congress can “address multiple related issues simultaneously, thereby al-
lowing negotiated compromises across related topics.”116 In the vertical-
federalism context, Professor Bagenstos notes that negotiations in which 
the federal executive grants state exemptions to congressional statutes 
offers benefits to all institutional actors that can only be achieved by 
political bargaining.117 In the horizontal-federalism context, Gerken and 
Holtzblatt argue that even the friction caused by judicially unresolved 
horizontal spillovers among the states is beneficial for prodding political 
actors “to do what they are supposed to do: politic, find common 
ground, negotiate a compromise.”118 
Professor Huq similarly contends that political bargaining is 
desirable because the political branches can act prospectively to resolve 
boundary disputes, creating less deadweight loss and greater predict-
ability of process for the future. He adds that elected officials also have 
better democratic credentials than federal judicial actors.119 In contrast, 
                                                                                                                           
 115. Id. 
 116. Rosen, supra note 83, at 34. 
 117. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver, supra note 75, at 1. 
 118. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 77, at 63. 
 119. Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1683. 
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the judiciary can respond only retrospectively, after a conflict has arisen 
and the institutional actors have already committed to some course of 
action, and with tools that are “clumsy, costly, and prone to manip-
ulation.”120 Moreover, he argues that judicial review of structural 
dilemmas is more likely to destabilize the field than political bargaining: 
[M]any institutional border disputes arise when neither 
constitutional text nor original understanding provides univocal 
answers. As a result, judicial resolution of intermural border 
disputes tends to pivot on contentious, highly controverted 
theories of constitutional interpretation . . . . It is by no means 
clear that recourse to grand constitutional theory is a superior 
decisional procedure to bargaining. Disputes that turn on 
historical evidence and constitutional theory will tend to be 
expensive to litigate. Ex ante, they produce uncertainty. There is 
also no guarantee that dueling grand theories of constitutional 
design yield anything other than a “draw.” On the contrary, 
observed patterns of ideological voting on the Supreme Court 
may raise a concern that the wide array of historical, theoretical, 
and precedential material from which answers can be derived 
leaves large free rein for judges’ priorities. As a result, reliance 
on grand theory to settle institutional-border disputes might 
undermine the predictability of dispute resolution. Judicial 
resolution, in short, is not necessarily a stabilizing force.121 
Huq further notes that judicial review usually only occurs when an 
aggrieved party (a “disgruntled defector”) invokes it, which may not be 
the best means of selecting cases for review on the basis of the overall 
public interest.122 
Critically, Huq’s support for political bargaining is not only rooted in 
the failures of judicial capacity to cope with structural uncertainty at the 
margins of textual directives. He further argues that this marginal 
constitutional indeterminacy is itself desirable, because the structural 
framework itself is constructed in anticipation of the needs for change 
and adaptation over time. As he explains, “the Constitution is not a ho-
meostatic system, but an evolutionary one.” He continues, “[t]he 
inevitable translation of constitutional concepts forward in time—against 
the backdrop of shifting institutional, social, and economic circum-
stances—necessarily generates intermural conflicts, even when the initial 
text has been completely specified. Bargaining is needed to resolve these 
conflicts in the first instance.”123 He argues that the political branches 
possess the best capacity for negotiating the needed adaptation, and he 
observes that bargaining has grown especially important because the 
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 123. Id. at 1656–57. 
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Article V amendment process is notoriously preclusive of change.124 For 
Huq, the possibility of structural bargaining thus stabilizes the system 
against economic and social crisis.125 
My work in the vertical context shares Huq’s assessment of the 
comparable capacity of judicial and political actors for coping with 
uncertain structural boundaries.126 Troubling governance paralysis after 
famous instances of judicial intervention in federalism bargaining give us 
reason to question the value of these judicially enforceable constraints in 
comparison to the judicially invalidated results of political bargaining.127 
Still, my own claim extends beyond the suggestion that political bargain-
ing deserves deference because it will produce more socially desirable 
results than judicial review. In addition, my claim makes the more am-
bitious proposal that political bargaining can sometimes perform the task 
of constitutional interpretation better than judicial review. 
Indeed, this is the critical normative claim of Negotiating Federalism 
and Federalism and the Tug of War Within: that federalism bargaining is not 
only a pragmatic solution to a problem of doctrinal uncertainty; it can 
also become, itself, a legitimate way of interpreting the Constitution’s 
federalism directives, and more faithfully than is possible by unitary 
judicial review.128 When we understand constitutional interpretation as 
any means of constraining public institutions to act consistently with 
constitutional directives, then: 
Federalism bargaining achieves interpretive status when it 
procedurally incorporates not only the consent principles that 
legitimize bargaining in general, but also the fundamental 
federalism values that should guide federalism interpretation in 
any forum. After all, the core federalism values are essentially 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See Huq, Structural Constitution, supra note 1, at 1665 (arguing preclusive diffi-
culty of constitutional change through Article V renders intermural bargaining 
“exceptionally salient channel” for institutional dispute resolution); supra notes 119–122 
(summarizing Huq’s arguments in favor of political branch resolution of intermural 
conflicts). 
 125. Id. Huq further elaborates that: 
Unable to adjust the text through Article V without exorbitant transaction costs, 
institutional actors have strong incentives to bargain among themselves to reach 
stable outcomes. Entrenchment at the level of specific politicians and factions, as 
opposed to at the constitutional level, creates a motivation to fashion workable 
governance arrangements and to find adaptations to new circumstances. Para-
doxically, negotiated change may stabilize the overall constitutional dispensation 
by staving off economic or social crisis. On this view, stability under conditions of 
social, economic, and geopolitical flux is not obtained by resisting new insti-
tutional arrangements. 
 Id. 
 126. E.g., Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 230, 296–300, 329–33, 366–67. 
 127. See id. at 226–30 (describing failed radioactive-waste management policies after 
Supreme Court’s partial invalidation of Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act). 
 128. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 269–70; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra 
note 8, at 9–10. 
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realized through good governance procedure . . . . Incor-
porating these values into the bargaining process allows nego-
tiators to interpret federalism directives procedurally when 
consensus on the substance is unavailable . . . . Bargaining that 
procedurally safeguards rights, enhances participation, fosters 
innovation, and harnesses interjurisdictional synergy accom-
plishes what federalism is designed to do—and what federalism 
interpretation is ultimately for. As such, it warrants interpretive 
deference from a reviewing court, or any branch actor inter-
rogating the result. Of course, not all federalism bargaining will 
do so. Bargaining that allocates authority through processes 
that weaken rights, threaten democratic participation, under-
mine innovation, and frustrate problem solving is not consistent 
with federalism values, and warrants no interpretive deference. 
The more consistency with these values of good governing 
process, the more interpretive deference is warranted; the less 
procedural consistency with these values, the less interpretive 
deference is warranted.129 
By this view, political bargaining is desirable not only because political 
institutions possess the capacity to produce socially optimal results in 
comparison with judicially mediated allocation.130 It is also desirable 
because, at least in the federalism context, the process of bilaterally 
negotiated agreement is more consistent with the underlying principles 
of good governance that the constitutional separation-of-powers is 
intended to foster. As I observe, “[d]rawing on the procedural appli-
cation of fair bargaining and core federalism values, bilaterally negoti-
ated governance opens possibilities for filling inevitable interpretive gaps 
left by judicial and legislative mandates. Indeed, it has been doing so all 
along.”131 
Nevertheless, a few authors are less convinced that structural 
bargaining is ever useful, especially in the horizontal context. For 
example, Professor Vermeule argues that “[t]here is no systematic reason 
to think that this sort of bargaining will produce efficient outcomes . . . 
or other benefits such as the protection of liberty.”132 He notes that the 
Coase theorem is inapplicable to the separation-of-powers context due to 
“externalities that cannot always be internalized through bargaining” 
and significant transaction costs, including “all manner of posturing, 
                                                                                                                           
 129. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 349; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 
8, at 113. 
 130. See supra notes 67–78 (citing new wave of scholarship examining importance of 
bargaining in federalism context). 
 131. Ryan, Tug of War, supra note 8, at 270. 
 132. Vermeule, Invisible Hand, supra note 34, at 1428. 
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pandering, bluffing, brinkmanship, and holdouts.”133 Bradley and 
Morrison are similarly concerned.134 
C. Judicial Review Should be Limited, but Potentially Available 
Reflecting the majority view among negotiated-governance scholars 
that structural bargaining can be useful, most of the literature is skeptical 
of the role of judicial review of political bargaining.135 In the vertical 
context, Moncrieff argues that “federalism enforcement should be left 
primarily to the more democratically legitimate branch: the legis-
lature.”136 Bulman-Pozen notes that dual federalism has always insisted on 
judicial review as a means of retaining state power, but that “integration 
of state and federal actors safeguards the separation of state and federal 
action.”137 In the horizontal context, Rosen argues that the institutional 
limitations of the judiciary lead to both under- and over-enforcement of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and that Congress should thus provide 
primary supervision.138 Most of these scholars agree that while courts are 
good at interpreting legal rules retrospectively to resolve a specific 
dispute, they lack the institutional capacity to proactively manage institu-
tional boundary disputes in vague and evolving constitutional contexts. 
However, and in contrast to the previous literature emphasizing 
structural safeguards by the political process, many authors in the new 
negotiated governance literature allow for some degree of judicial 
intervention to police the most foreseeable harms of political bargaining. 
Unsurprisingly, Bradley and Morrison openly favor judicial review of 
separation-of-powers disputes,139 but even authors more tolerant of 
political bargaining see a role for the judiciary. Moncrieff argues that 
while the judiciary should mostly defer to Congress, it should provide 
review for “extreme violations” of cost–benefit federalism.140 Fahey as-
sumes that judicial review of consent procedures is appropriate and 
argues that the Court should clarify its test for policing procedural 
bargaining harms.141 Gluck queries the extent to which state and federal 
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courts should review cooperative federalism regimes, while noting that 
many have yet to recognize the issues raised there as legitimate questions 
for federalism doctrine.142 Gerken and Holtzblatt observe that, while 
political safeguards are the best spillover corrective in horizontal federal-
ism, judicial review “provides a level of finality and certitude that the 
rough and chaotic realm of politics cannot.”143 Rossi advocates for judi-
cial deference to regulatory bargaining in general, but supports judicial 
safeguards when “private behavior influences the regulatory forum.”144 
Similarly, although the thrust of my proposal is to reduce judicial 
interference with federalism bargaining, the proposal nevertheless pre-
serves a limited role for judicial review to police for bargaining abuses 
and scrutinize processes that are not consistent with federalism’s values. 
Observing that the interpretive value of vertical political bargaining is 
enhanced by the horizontal check of judicial review, I argue: 
The availability of limited judicial review strengthens the 
institution of federalism bargaining in a variety of ways. The 
potential for neutral judicial oversight smooths leverage im-
balances and due process problems that could otherwise 
frustrate mutual consent, compromise checks and balances, and 
hinder local participation. Judicial review gives procedural re-
quirements for accountability and transparency enforceable 
bite. Just as parties to a contract bargain more efficiently when 
secure in the knowledge that fair bargaining norms are pro-
tected by contract law, so too will federalism bargaining parties 
negotiate more productively when secure that the process must 
be consistent with constitutional and fairness norms. Contrasted 
with pure political safeguards, interpretive work by the political 
branches that is made falsifiable by judicial review will com-
mand greater political respect. Moreover, to the extent that the 
carrot of judicial deference provides meaningful incentive to 
engineers and participants, the proposal will encourage inter-
governmental bargaining that better harmonizes with federal-
ism values, advancing the goals of federalism itself.145 
Nevertheless, the proposal notes that judicial review of federalism-based 
challenges to the products of structural bargaining should be limited by a 
threshold inquiry for interpretive integrity, sheltering instances where 
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the bargaining process itself offers the best realization of federalism 
values.146 
Huq is even more protective of judicial deference to political 
bargaining, concluding that the default rule should be nonjusti-
ciability.147 He argues that courts should treat the products of horizontal 
bargaining with the same kind of deference they apply to all political 
action, and for the same reason—judicial recognition of the primacy of 
elected officials in making political decisions.148 However, he acknowl-
edges that the unique properties of interbranch bargaining may prevent 
it from operating as the “well-functioning market” he would prefer, and 
he recognizes a few categories of foreseeable harms that warrant some 
kind of oversight.149 
These harms include problems of negative externalities, or 
circumstances in which bargaining causes substantial third-party im-
pacts,150 and paternalism-warranting “internalities,” in which institutional 
collective-action problems lead to errant decisionmaking in bargain-
ing.151 Indeed, it is the potential for these negative internalities, includ-
ing the historic tendency of congressional acquiescence to unilateral 
executive encroachment, that underlies Bradley and Morrison’s mistrust 
and corresponding advocacy for judicial review of political bargaining.152 
Huq also recognizes the problems of interbranch asymmetry that may 
favor the executive branch in intramural bargaining contexts and ack-
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nowledges cause to be more suspicious of bargains that reflect inattentive 
institutional drift (acquiescence) rather than purposeful negotiation.153 
For that reason, Huq appears resigned to the possibility that the 
presumption of nonjusticiability may be overcome in extreme 
circumstances: 
At the very least, there is no reason to think that courts should 
always be preferred fora for the resolution of intermural 
boundary disputes: Courts should treat the outcomes of such 
negotiation with at least their traditional measure of deference 
in recognition of elected actors’ primacy—as they have done for 
much of American history. Read aggressively, the arguments 
presented in this Part suggest that it is elected actors who 
should bear primary and perhaps sole responsibility for deter-
mining when third-party effects or internality-like limitations on 
an institution’s capabilities warrant withdrawal from the wide 
and pervasive sphere of intermural bargaining.154 
He does not present a clear picture of the mechanics for rebutting that 
presumption, or according to what standards such judicial review should 
proceed. The omission of more detail here suggests that he may be 
imagining application of the current judicial separation-of-powers 
doctrine in these extreme cases, suggesting that his proposal merely 
operates to increase the threshold for when horizontal branch bargain-
ing becomes subject to review. It would be useful to know more about 
Huq’s thoughts on this. But in the meanwhile, he clearly concludes that 
“[t]he structural constitution should be negotiated—and not 
litigated.”155 
D. Points of Divergence 
In addition to these themes of agreement, the negotiated-structural-
governance literature reveals interesting points of dissensus. Many 
scholars focus exclusively on vertical or horizontal structural bargaining, 
and not every argument in one camp applies as forcefully to the other (as 
Huq, who addresses both, is careful to recognize156). Other differences 
reflect the impacts of diverging theoretical vocabulary more than clear 
normative disagreement, such as scholars’ various appeals to law and 
economics, negotiation theory, political theory, market theory, minority 
participation, and other distinctive frames of reference. 
However, these diverging frames of reference occasionally lead to 
important differences in analysis. For example, authors like Huq, 
Vermeule, and Moncrieff analyze political bargaining by metrics of social 
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utility, measuring various alternatives in terms of their foreseeable costs 
and benefits. My work does this to some extent as well, but more like the 
work of Bulman-Pozen, ultimately grounds its support in the relationship 
between well-crafted bargaining and constitutional good-governance 
principles. For me, structural bargaining that warrants deference is bar-
gaining that procedurally advances the values of governance that under-
lie the separation of powers to begin with. Indeed, Huq and I may 
especially disagree on this particular point, given that I include checks 
and balances to protect individuals among these principles, and Huq 
asserts that “there is no necessary linkage between separated powers and 
liberty.”157 Vermeule appears to disagree with Huq on this point as well, 
though they both write from the perspective of law and economics.158  
A related point of dissensus is the different approaches various 
scholars take toward the question of whether accomplishing good 
structural governance is a matter of process or principle, or whether we 
should focus on means or ends. Rodríguez emphasizes the intrinsic value 
of procedure, noting that she “ultimately believe[s] we can still express 
proceduralist preferences for decentralized decision-making, regardless 
of the perspective adopted.”159 However, Bulman-Pozen argues that 
process-federalism scholars have “unmoored federalism from constitu-
tionally fixed spheres of state and federal action” and criticizes them for 
mistakenly believing “that national political parties and the administra-
tive state [will] preserve autonomous state governance and distinctive 
state interests.”160 
Nevertheless, taken together, the work in the collection bridges this 
gap by considering the relationship between process and principle. 
Gerken frames the issue in terms of the dialectic between the means and 
ends of structural governance. She considers federalism a means toward 
a well-functioning democracy, rather than an end in itself.161 Yet my own 
work explores the functional relationship between process and principle 
in structural governance. Gerken and I agree that structural governance 
is a means to the end of a well-functioning democracy, and I argue that, 
at least in the vertical context, the measure of a well-functioning federal-
ism are the good governance values that we turn to federalism to help us 
                                                                                                                           
 157. Id. at 1667 n.382. 
 158. Cf. Vermeule, Invisible Hand, supra note 34, at 1428 (“There is no systematic 
reason to think that this sort of bargaining will produce efficient outcomes . . . or other 
benefits such as the protection of liberty.”). 
 159. Rodríguez, supra note 74, at 2099. 
 160. Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process, supra note 71, at 1928, 1932. 
 161. See Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 25 (manuscript at 27) 
(arguing work of new nationalists “suggest[] that the relationship between means and 
ends isn’t as clean or as linear as many have assumed”). 
2015] NEGOTIATING FEDERALISM 37 
 
accomplish. Which are, themselves, procedural values.162 Process and 
principle are thus inextricably intertwined. The means and ends are one. 
CONCLUSION 
The new literature on negotiated structural governance reveals 
important points of convergence and divergence, some of them depart-
ing markedly from the scholarship on which it develops. Themes include 
the inevitability of political bargaining as a means of allocating contested 
authority, the potential desirability of political bargaining as an 
alternative to judicial allocation, and the potential for limited judicial 
review for extreme bargaining abuses. Differences among scholars in-
clude the varying frameworks of analysis they apply, the diverging metrics 
by which they evaluate the worthiness of political bargaining, and their 
conceptions of structural-governance bargaining in relationship to 
constitutional processes and principles. 
Core questions remain that warrant additional scrutiny in the next 
iteration of the discourse, especially in the horizontal interbranch con-
text. For example, Huq advocates for nonjusticiable bargaining, while 
(grudgingly) allowing for the possibility of judicial review in some cases. 
But according to what standard should judicial review of interbranch 
bargaining be withheld or granted?163 If limited judicial review is allowed, 
how should the doctrine of standing function in that context? In both 
the vertical and horizontal contexts, who should and should not be 
entitled to litigate separation-of-powers harms? How can the courts guard 
against the “disgruntled defector” problem that Huq warns of?164 
In particular, more research is needed to assess the fascinating sig-
nificance of the fact that federalism bargaining has garnered more 
acceptance than interbranch bargaining. As Professor Huq observes, the 
Court’s horizontal separation-of-powers jurisprudence is “spackled with 
inalienability rules that formalistically limit the forms of permissible 
interbranch bargaining.”165 He argues that horizontal bargaining should 
be allowed to proceed more like vertical bargaining. Indeed, vertical 
bargaining is also constrained by important judicial precedent (like the 
anticommandeering and spending power doctrines), but it nevertheless 
continues to a much larger extent. Prompted by Huq’s initial foray, it will 
be valuable to further consider why vertical-federalism bargaining out-
paces horizontal interbranch bargaining, and whether they should pro-
ceed on equal footing. Are the structural constitutional entitlements 
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used in vertical bargaining somehow different in kind from the entitle-
ments used in horizontal bargaining? Does interbranch bargaining 
threaten the values that underlie separation-of-powers constraints in 
some more meaningful way? 
Alternatively, is there simply less constitutional ambiguity in the 
horizontal than vertical context and a smaller zone of jurisdictional 
overlap? Is the difference an artifact of institutional asymmetry between 
the primary legislative and executive bargainers? Or is it just that there 
are fewer parties available to bargain in the horizontal context? Is there a 
greater threat of collusion in the horizontal context, where there are 
fewer bargaining parties? Or, as some critics of federalism bargaining 
have suggested, is state–federal collusion ultimately the bigger threat?166 
Finally, it will be important to consider the role of noninstitutional 
actors in structural-governance bargaining, both directly and indirectly. 
In the vertical context, governance processes increasingly include 
stakeholder inputs that enable private parties, organizations, and others 
to participate in the deliberation of federalism-sensitive governance. In 
the horizontal context, the political branches reach out for private 
partnerships in governance implementation. Are these significant points 
of contact for the purpose of evaluating structural bargaining? Are there 
ramifications of transitioning campaign finance laws for the debate over 
structural bargaining? Does the participation or influence of noninsti-
tutional actors change the calculus on judicial review of structural bar-
gaining? Should it? 
Each new question raises others, indicating that we still have much 
to look forward to from the emerging structural-bargaining literature. As 
the challenges confronted by governance increase in complexity, the 
demands we place on government will intensify accordingly. The dynam-
ics between institutions of government will encounter new pressures and 
possibilities within our elaborate constitutional system of rules and rela-
tionships, checks and balances, invitations to compete and to collaborate. 
The Constitution provides a remarkably robust framework in which to 
navigate these challenges, but it does not resolve every question about 
the permissible scope of structural bargaining. For this, we must rely on 
the best collective wisdom of the leaders, jurists, theorists, and citizens 
that negotiate within the constraints of the Structural Constitution every 
day. Important questions remain as the discourse continues to unfold. 
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